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OUTLINE FOR
THE AGE DISCRIMINATION AND EMPLOYMENT ACT
AND EEOC GUIDELINES ON
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
FEDERAL BAR ASSOCIATION
MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA
March 27, 1981
By
John D. Schmelzer
I

AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT (ADEA)
I.

II.

29 U.S.C.

621-634 - General.

A.

Originally enacted in 1967; amended 1974; amended again
1978.

B.

Coverage - protects individuals between 40 and 70 years;
applies to private employers of 20 or more employees _
(Title VY:'I-lS) ;
covers labor organizations and employment agencies
(same as Title VII);
covers state and local governments (same as Title VII):
applies to federal government (coverage 40 to no upper
limit) .

c.

ADEA's substantive and procedural provisions are similar but not identical to Title VII.

TIME LIMITATIONS'AND OTHER PROCEDURAL PREREQUISITES
A.

CP has 180 days from last act of discrimination to file
charge with EEOC if no state agency dealing with age
discrimination.

B.

CP has 300 days to file charge with EEOC if state
agency or within 30 days after notice by state that
its age proceeding has concluded whichever is earlier.

c.

D.

CP's failure to file timely charge with state agency
does not affect feqeral right: hence, as long as CP
'files charge with EEOC within 300 days (if in state
prohibiting Age discrimination) CP has complied with
prerequisite to filing suit.
~ Os~_Mayer v. Evans,
441 U.S. 750 (1979).
Best protection for CP - attempt to file with EEOC
within 180 days.
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E.

Issue - When is the last act of discrimination in a
discharge case? Most courts hold: time runs from notice
of discharge rather than subsequent attempts (arbitration or internal procedures) to reverse the discharge.

F.

CP must wait 60 days before filing suit after filing
a charge.

I
~

Pur~ose

A.

General

1)

Either party can request jury trial (no juries in
Title VII because equitable action) .

2)

No class actions may be brought pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. Rule 23 (unlike Title VII). However, opt in
collective actions permitted. See LaChapelle v.
-owe·ns~:IllJJl.6is·, 513
F. 2d 286 (5th Cir. 1975) •
.

B.

C.

- allow period for informal resolution of charge.

-

3)

CP cannot intervene in ADEA suit brought by EEOC
(CP in Title VII has statutory right to intervene _
an EEOC suit 1.

4)

EEOC suit cuts off rights of private CP.

Statutes of Limitations
1.

CP must file suit within three years of discriminatory act for willful violations of ADEA; two years
for other violations.

2.

Wil1fu11 violation - any violation that is intentional, knowing, or voluntary, as opposed to accidental. Almost all violations are willful. See
Wehr v. Burrough Corp., 619 F.2d 276 (3rd Cir. 1980).

3.

Limitation period may be tolled for EEOC but not
private party up to I year while attempting to
secure employer's voluntary compliance.

for

Damages
1.

CP can recover."amounts owing" - backpay
"liquidated damages" - double damages for willful
violation; non dis.cretionary - hence if violation is willful CP must get damages liquidated.
"Other legal or equitable relief (reinstatement).

3

2.

Most courts against awarding punitive damages:
argument for - punitive damages are form of legal
relief; generally available under a statute unless
specifically negated.
argument against - creates windfall to CP since
they already receive liquidated damages.
1

IV.

V.

EEOC E~ORCEMENT ACTIONS

A.

Prior to suit EEOC must attempt to eliminate the discriminatory practice through informal methods of conference, conciliation and persuasion. Statutory requirement - section 7(b).

B.

Elements of Conciliation
1.

inform employer of violation.

2.

necessary measures for compliance.

3.

back wages may be recovered by employees.

4.

EEOC may bring puit.

s.

opportunity for employer to respond.

-

PROHIBITIONS OF ADEA

A.

Employer cannot refuse to hire, or discharge, or discrimination against any individual with·respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of age (two exceptions--certain tenured
professors until 1982 and executives with retirement
benefits of 27,000 can be involuntarily retired between
65-70).

B.

Limit, segregate or classify employees • • • denying employment OI?Po;r:tuni:ty, or· othetw'is-e adversely affecting their
s-tatus B~cau~e ~f age.
Employer can not reduce the wage rate of employee in
order to comply with ADEA.

C.
D.

Retaliation provision - can not discriminate against
individual because they have filed a charge, testified
or assisted in any investigation, proceeding or litigation under ADEA.
.
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VI. STATUTORY.DEFENSES
A.

Lawful for defendant to discriminate if the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age.
Discharge case - issue is a "factor other than age,"
the -higher salary of an older employee?
oldtr employee in the same position as a younger employee will generally earn more because of seniority.
Hence - is the older employee's higher salary "a factor
other than age" and therefore a valid criterion justifying the discharge?
Courts split - depends on facts.

B.

Employer can discharge or otherwise discipline an individual for good cause.
Employer may show CP's performance was substandard or
CP had negative attitude toward job or co-employees.
Employer may show other employees similarly situated
were disciplined in same manner.

C.

D.

Age as a Bona Fide Occupational Qualification (BFOQ)
defense.

-

1.

Congress has allowed discrimination based on age
whenever age is "reasonably necessary to the normal
operation of the particular business."

2.

BFOQ can not be based on stereotyping; defendant
has burden of proving empirical data supporting
their assumption. Courts construe BFOQ's narrowly.

3.

BFOQ defense accepted most frequently where safety
issue important. Bus drivers; airline pilots; firemen.
Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, 499 F.2d 859
(7th Cir. 1974). See also EEOC v City of St. Paul,
23 EPD Par. 31,078 (D. Minn. 1980), where trial
court concluded that age was not a B~OQ justifying age 65 forced retirement of a district fire
chief. BFOQ,upheld, however, for line firefighters.

Employer Adherence to a Bona Fide Seniority system or
any bona fide employee benefit plan such as retirement,
pension or insurance plan which is not a subterfuge to
evade purpose of ADEA, except no plan may require the
involuntary retirement of any individual between 40-70.
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1.

This provision indicates Congress' recognition that
employee benefit plans may cost more for older
workers than the cost for providing those same
benefits to younger workers.

2.

Accordingly, Labor and now EEOC guidelines permit
an employer to provide reduced benefits to older
iworkers if the reduction can be justified on the
(basis of cost or reasonable actuarial data. Hence,
no violat'ion of ADEA, if benefits reduced for older
workers as long as cost to employer for older workers
is the same as cost for younger workers, although
younger workers may be receiving greater benefits.
Actual data may be computed with respect to an entire benefit package or on a benefit by benefit
basis.

3.

4.

VII.

To reduce benefits for older workers
a.

plan must be bona fide

b.

action taken must observe the terms of plan·

c.

can not be a subterfuge to avoid ADEA

d.

must be based on actuarial data

This provision also applicable to layoff situations;
a.

prior to 1978 Arnendments--if company faced with
layoff, could force older workers to take.advantage of early retirement, if action taken
pursuant to bona fide retirement plan.

b.

if there was no provision for early retirement,
then the forced retirement was violation of ADEA.

c.

now - this section prohibits forcing older employees to take advantage of early retirement.

PROVING AN ADEA VIOLATION
A.

Problem - Plaintiff must prove that defendant made decision because of Cp's age. Difficult to prove this
through overt acts or employer statements but can be
done through pres~ptions and inferences. .

B.

Allocation of Proof in' an ADEA case similar to Title VII.
1.

See McDonnell-Douglas Corp. vs. Green, 411 u.s. 792
(1973) (first Supreme Court decision on burdens of
proof in Title VII case).

.
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2.

Texa~ Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, U.S.,
No. 79-1764 (March 4, 1981) (Supreme Court's most
recent decision on burden of proof under Title VII) •

3.

Cova v. Coca-Coca Bottling, 574 F.2d 958 (8th Cir.
1978) (ADEA discharge case which sets out burdens
for parties); see also Loeb v. Textron Inc., 600
F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1979).

r!1 a.

Plaintiff must first establish prima facie case
by showing:
1)

CP within protected group (40-70);

2)

CP met applicable job qualifications;

3)

despite qualifications, CP was discharged;

4)

after discharge, emp10yer sought applications
from persons with similar qualifications

NOTE:

b.

Employers frequently argue that CP replacement must be outside the protected
c1ass--younger than 40.

-

Employer now has burden of production to rebut
prima facie case by showing:
1) the discharge was "for good cause" or;

2) the discharge was "based on reasonable factor
other than age."
c.
C.

Plaintiff must then establish defendant's explanation is pretext for age discrimination.

Plaintiff's Burden Demonstrate age influenced the
adverse employment decision.
1.

Courts split - lenient view--if age considered
then improper.

2.

More common view - "but for test"--CP must show that
age was a determining factor--a real reason--for
defendant's action.
The adverse decision would not
have been made but for CP's age.
See Loeb v. Textron Inc., 600.F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1979).
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D.

Statistical Evidence
1.

Can be used by both plaintiff and defendant to
support various inferences.

2.

Most commonly used in layoff and reorganization cases:

,

a.

Compare age composition of workforce before reorganization to age of workforce after reorganization.

b.

Average age of discharged employee versus
average age of retained employees.

c.

The statistics between groups should show large
discrepancy in age. Mastie v. Great Lakes
Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Mich. 1976).

•
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SEXUAL

I.

II.

HARASS~mNT

THE PROBLEM
A.

Most commonly men exploiting their position and power
ove~women in the workplace so that they can make
sexva1 advances·or suggestions. Issue is--is this
ponduct a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964?

B.

Frequency.

EEOC'S GUIDELINES ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT - 29 CFR 1604.11
A.

B.

General
1.

EEOC amended its guidelines on sex discrimination
to include section on Sexual Harassment. 45 Fed.
Reg. 74,676 (Nov. 10, 1980).

2.

Guidelines criticized by employer groups during
comment period. 45 Fed. Reg. 25,024 (April 11, 1980).

Content
1.

Definition of Sexual Harassment -- u~we1comed sexual
advances, or requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct constitutes sexual
harassment when:
a.

submission is a condition of employment;

b.

submission or rejection of conduct is basis
for employment decisions;

c.

conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or
offensive work environment.

2.

When determining sexual harassment, EEOC look~ at
record as a whole and totality of circumstances.,
Harassment is fact specific and to be determined
on case by case basis.

3.

Sexual harassment coromi tted by super·vis:o'r- -"empl"oyer
held strict~y liable regardless of whether employer
"knew or should have known of harassment.
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4.

5.

C.
III.

Sexual harassment committed by non-supervisory or
line personnel -- employer held liable only where
it knew or should have known of sexual harassment.
Employer can obviate liability by showing it took
immediate steps to correct problem.
Prevention - most effective means of avoiding
Jliability. Affirmatively raising subject, express! ing company disapproval -- penalty for those engaging
. in sexual harassment, develop appropriate sanctions,
inform employees how to raise issues.

EEOC's purpose in promulgating guidelines -- codification of existing law; prevention.

LEADING DECISIONS ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT

A.

B.

Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
Employer held liable for sexual harassment committed
by supervisor even though:
1.

Employer ,gad policy against sexual harassment;

2.

Employer had internal procedures for bringing
problem to higher management and plaintiff failed to exhaust these remedies.

Bundy v. Jackson,
Cir. 1981).

F.2d

, 24 FEP 1155 (D.C.

Employer held liable even though victim of sexual
harassment suffered no loss of any economic or
tangible job benefits -- no failure to promote or
job abolished.
Burden of proof different in sexua~ harassment case
--once plaintiff has shown sexual harassment and
trying to establish backpay for failure to promote, "plaintiff should enter ritual order of
proof at advantage over typical Title VII claimant."

c.

Tompkins' v.' PubTic S:e~'vj:'ce,' 568 F .. 2d 1044 C3rd' Cir~ .
1977) ; Garber v.' Saxon, 522 F.2d 10:32 (~th Ci.r<t 1977t;
Barnes v. Co'stle f 561 F.2d 9.73 (D •. Cot. Cir •. 19,771.; All
ho1d--cause of action under Title VII against an, employer
,where supervis.pr was guilty, of sexu~~ ha~qssrnent and
plaintiff suffered 'adverse 'job status Ci.e., ba,d evaluation, failure to promote,' fired, or oth~r ~spects of
career development!".
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